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THE FINAL JUDGMENT AS A BASIS
FOR APPEAL
CARLETON M. CRICK*
IN connection with the mechanics of an appeal two principal
problems arise. First, we have the question of the method by
which a review may be obtained, and second, the problem of at
what stage of the proceeding in the trial court an appeal can
be taken. The two are not unconnected, but it is with the second
that this paper will mainly be concerned. Decisions of the trial
court from which counsel will wish to appeal may occur, of
course, in many stages of the case. It may be a ruling relating
to service of process or an order with regard to the pleadings.
Hope for a reversal may be based upon some ruling handed
down in a preliminary hearing or during the course of the trial,
or it may be some decision made during the process of enforce-
ment of the judgment to which objection is made. A funda-
mental question necessarily arises, therefore, as to just when
the appeal may be taken. The extremes of the proposition are
that either each ruling or decision is appealable, or on the other
hand, that only when the last or final judgment is rendered can
a review be had. In the United States it is agreed that we have
taken the second of the two extremes, and all the books concur
in the general prdposition that appeal can be taken only from
a final judgment.' The policy behind this rule is said to be that
it is the only way in which the appellate court can prevent itself
from being swamped with appeals. The following quotation is
typical of many of the cases:
"The apparent object of this statutory restriction on the right
of appeal is to prevent the protraction of litigation to an indefi-
nite period by reiterated applications for an exercise of the re-
visory powers of the appellate tribunal. If, for alleged error
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in any interlocutory proceeding, a case could be brought here
for revision, a multiplicity of appeals would create vexatious
delay, and might eventually result in a ruinous accumulation of
Costs." 2
But, say the same authorities, there is a regrettable difficulty
involved in the application of the rule.3 What is a final judg-
ment, and does final always mean final? The treatment of the
subject usually takes the form of a statement of the rule in one
sentence, followed by many definitions of what constitutes a
final judgment (of which the reader may take his choice, depend-
ing, presumably, upon what result he wishes to reach), the whole
enlivened by variations and refinements set out in voluminous
footnotes.4 That all has not been well we may gather from no
less an authority than the United States Supreme Court when
it says with admirable restraint, "Probably no question of equity
practice has been the subject of more frequent discussion in this
court than the finality of decrees .... The cases, it must be
conceded, are not altogether harmonious." '
In the present paper the writer proposes to examine this prob-
lem of at what point in the case an appeal should be allowed. Did
the rule requiring a final judgment arise, as stated above, in
the effort to avoid excessive appeals? Does it in fact accomplish
that result, and is it suited to the needs and requirements of our
modern system of courts?
Systems of law which provide appellate courts for the review
of decisions inevitably come into contact with this problem.
Thus, when the Roman law, after an early period when there
was no relief from the decisions of a magistrate, set ui a com-
plicated system of appeals,' a practice whereby they were al-
2 Waverly Mut. & Permanent Land, Loan & Bldg. Ass'n v. Buck, 64 AIld.
338, 342 (1885).
3 "The difficulty lies in its (the definition's) concrete application. In
applying the test the federal courts seem to have regarded substance rather
than form, and to have been guided by practical rather than by purely
theoretical considerations." DoBIE, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND
PROCEDURE (1928) 792. We may wonder if this is not 'the author's way
of telling us that it is not wise to pay too much attention to the definitions.
4 See 3 C. J. 441 § 258, which gives seventeen consecutive definitions of
a final judgment.
5 McGourkey v. Toledo & Ohio Cent. Ry., 146 U. S. 536, 544, 13 Sup.
Ct. 170, 172 (1892), per Brown, 3.
6 At this time it is necessary to make some observations concerning
terminology and the methods of appellate review. The paucity of terms
in which to deal with the process often results in using the same word
with different meanings in various placbs. For instance, I have used
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lowed from every decision was found to be burdensome, and
among other reforms, appeals were forbidden from, interlocutory
orders2' The early Germans, on the other hand, developed a
method whereby an appeal lay from every decision.8
From very early times in England the method whereby a liti-
gant came into the king's court and attacked a decision rendered
in a feudal or manorial court was the complaint of false judg-
ment.9 It was early decided, however, that the king's courts
could not be charged with a false judgment, 0 and the means
whereby the King's Bench corrected errors in the other common
law courts was by writ of error, the method destined to survive
in many jurisdictions to our own day. The common law de-
cisions involving writ of error are clearly the origin of our rule
that only final judgments are appealable. 1' The real factors in
the establishment of this practice must go back to the very be-
ginning of the history of the writ of error, and it is impossible
at this time to give more than an explanation which is merely
plausible.
John de Ralegh's Case12 in the 14th Century at least shows
"appeal" (and its derivative adjective, "appellate") as a general term
to describe methods by which reviewing courts pass on the decisions of
the trial courts. But the term, "appeal," also has a technical meaning by
which it describes the particular method used in Roman Law, Canon Law,
and in chancery proceedings in England. Used thus, it involves some
elements of a retrial in the upper court, or at least a consideration of
the facts as -well as the law of the case. On the other hand, the verb
"appellare" was used in the English common law, and in French law
to describe the act of a party who brings a criminal charge against an-
other, an "appeal of felony." 'We look in vain for any account of appeal
in the sense of review at common law; such proceedings are discussed
in all the books under the title "error," or "false judgment"
7 ENGELTANN, HIsTORY OF CONTINENTAL CIVIL PROCEDunE (Continental
Legal History Series) (1927) 367-9. And see BuCKLAND, TE XTBOOK OF
ROM4-N LAW (1921) 665: "It [appeal] might be on the final judgment or
on one of the interlocutory judgments, though some of these latter were
unappealable in late law and practically all under Justinian."
8 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (2d ed. 1899) 666.
(Referred to hereafter as POLLOCK AND MAITLAND.)
9 FITZHERBERT, NEW NATURA BREVIi (9th ed. 1794) § 38.20 2 PoLLOCK AND MAITLAND 666.
-i This was recognized by Mr. Justice Lamar in McLish v. Roff, 141
U. S. 661, 12 Sup. Ct. 118 (1891). The writ of error in that case was
brought under Section 5 of the Act of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat. 826, c.
517), which related to the United States Court for the Indian Territory.
The section provided for appeals in cases in which the jurisdiction of
the court was in issue, but did not mention at what point in the case
it should be taken. The Supreme Court held, however, that the question
could be raised only on the final judgment, even though this was not
required by the Act. ir. Justice Lamar said that the Judiciary Act of
1789 in limiting appeals to final judgments only declared "a well settled
and ancient rule of English practice."
- Y. B. 17 Ed. 3 (R. S.) 234 (1343).
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some arguments used at that time in connection with the prob-
lem. The matter seems to be connected in some way with the
"record" by which the proceedings in the lower court are made
known to the King's Bench, for counsel in his argument says,
"You have no warrant to try this record for the record is not
fully here, because the case is still pending in another Court....
It is impossible that on one and the same original writ there
should be tvo records in different courts." This same conception
that the record cannot be in two courts at once is found to be
present in a number of other early English cases.13 What was
the nature of this "record"?
The earliest physical evidences of court proceedings extant
go back to Richard I, but it seems likely that the practice of
enrolling the pleas began under Henry 11.14 Prior to that time,
when there was any dispute as to what had occurred in an earlier
case, the justices "bore record" by relying on their memories,"'
and indeed, the origin of our noun, record, which denotes a
physical memorandum, seems to have been in the Latin
recordari, which meant to remember.10 In Middle English (about
the period between 1100 and 1400), which is the time now under
discussion, .recorden meant to repeat or remember or remind."1
If we may believe Stephen, our legal term, record, is of French
derivation, brought into English law by the Normans, by whose
law recorder, it is said, anciently signified "to recite or testify
on recollection as occasion might require, what had passed in
court." 18 When, therefore, the practice of enrolling the proceed-
ings in court upon a roll of parchment began, there was a long
background of experience when the record was the oral report
of proceedings in the original court, and, as Maitland says, "it
was long before the theory was forgotten that the rolls of the
court were mere aids for the memories of the justices." I Thus
we have the ancient principle that "the record is properly not in
the parchment but in the breast of the judge." 20  It is not a
13 Humphrey Bohun's Case, Y. B. 34 Hen. 6, f. 41a (1456); Moecalf's
Case, 11 Co. 38a (1615); Spittlehouse v4 Farming, Style 290 (1651);
Fitzwilliams v. Copley, Dyer 290a (1670).
14 1 SELECT PLEAS OF THE CROWN (S. S. 1888) vii. I am referring, of
course, to the rolls of court, which later became more and more Identified
with the "record."
15 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND 670.
16 WNEBSTE 's NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1925), 1784.
17 Ibid., and at xxiv, §§ 33, 34.
IS STEPHEN, CoimON LAW PLEADING (1897) app. xviii and xix. In old
French the noun was r'ecort, which meant remembrance or attestation.
10 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND 670. Thus in 1292 the bare word of one
justice was preferred to the roll of another who had been guilty of
forging records. Ibid. n. 5, cit. Rot. Part. i, 84-5.
20 STEPHEN, Op. cit. supra note 18, at xix, cit. Y. B. 7 Hen. 6, f. 29
(1418): "Le Record est tout temps en les coeurs do Justices, ot to Roll
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particular roll of parchment but rather it was, as Coke has put
it, "a memorial or remembrance in rolls of parchment," 21 a
mere abstraction, of which the physical memoranda were but
evidence.
If we combine with this conception of the record, the fact that
a proceeding on a writ of error seems to have been regarded
as a new action, and not merely a continuation of the suit in the
inferior court, 2 we see how it may have been that the record
could not be sent up until the suit below had been completed.2 3
Suing out a writ of error before final judgment would result in
two actions in different courts, to the procedure of each of which
the formal record was essential. To remove it while the case
was pending below "would disturb the proceedings" there,2'
while the reviewing court could not proceed' until it was in-
formed of what had happened below.
But, if duplicate rolls were kept for each case, as seems
likely,25 then why was it not possible to keep one copy in the trial
court and to send the other to the court of error, after which
each court could proceed upon the roll before it? The only
answer seems to be that there was a conception of unity of the
formal record; the roll was not the record but only evidence of
'est fcrsque renermbrance pur le inelior suerty."
21 Co. Lrrr. 260a. The fact that the roll was not the record crops up
frequently in the treatises and cases. Thus in SELECT PLEAS OF THE CROWN
(S. S. 1888), case 62, we find the following: "The county and the coroners
record that he -was not outlawed. But the coroners' rolls and the sheriff's
roll testify that he was outlawed." Thus what the coroners record (or
testify to) is different from the story told by their rolls..
22 That the writ of error begins a new suit is widely recognized. See
the many cases cited in 3 C. J. 304, n. 53. And see 1 HoLDswonTH, HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAW (3d ed. 1923) 214, quoted infra note 23. The case pro-
ceeded in the reviewing court similarly to an ordinary trial of first in-
stance. Thus the plaintiff in error made his complaint (assigned the
errors), the defendant in error was summoned by writ of scirc facias,
and there was joinder of issue on the question of whether there was error.
It may be noted here that Holdsworth apparently has reached the
conclusion that the fact that the writ of error is regarded as a new pro-
ceeding is because it c6uld be brought only on final judgments, although
he has no citation to support it, and the statement is not at all clear.
After discussing the old concept of an appeal or review as a charge against
the judge, he says: "Two consequences followed logically from the older
conception. Firstly, the proceedings (in error) were new proceedings.
The case must have been settled by final judgment; and therefore the
proceedings taken to upset that judgment were new proceedings.
:HoLDSWoRTH, op. cit. supra note 22, at 214.
There is nothing to indicate what was the connection between a pro-
ceeding against the judge, and the requirement of final judgment before
error could be brought. But it is easy to see why a quasi-criminal pro-
ceeding against the judge would be recognized as a new proceeding.
24 See the Spittlehouse case selpra note 13.
25 SELECT PLEAS OF THE CROWN (S. S. 1888) ix.
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it, and it could be in only one court at a time.20
Upon this basis then, the argument in John de Ralegh's Case
and the other decisions may be explained, but whether it is only
a rationalization of a custom with a different origin, or whether
the practice started because of some such conceptions as those
just discussed it is impossible to say with certainty.
We may note further that in some of the later cases it is said
that the words of the writ of error require that the record be
sent up "if judgment be thereupon rendered" 22 so that if the
court wishes to label the decision an "award" or an "order"
then error does not lie. This has all the earmarks of a mere
rationalization to justify an existing practice, but together with
the concept of the unity of the formal record, it does serve to
indicate that at common law the rule was never thought of as a
method of preventing excessive appeals. Of that, at least, we
can be reasonably certain. The early time at which the practice
was invoked, the 14th Century in John de Ralegh's Case, alone
precludes the idea that it arose in the effort to restrict appeals,
for in those days the courts were seeking to extend their juris-
diction rather than to narrow it.
However it may have originated, therefore, we may feel as-
sured that in our own time, when appellate courts began to be
burdened with appeals, they used as an escape a ready made
device which had its uncertain origin in the dim and remote
history of the appellate procedure of the English common law. 8
26 This statement that the record could only be in one court at t time
is borne out by interesting cases involving writs of error from the courts
of Ireland to the King's Bench in England. The practice was to keep one
roll in Ireland, and to send another copy to the English court. In one
of these cases we find Lord Holt saying: "It is the very record which
comes here out of Ireland, and not the transcript of it .... When the
record . . . arrives here then it is the true record, and not before, and
that which is in Ireland ceases to be the record." Coot v. Linch, 1 Ld.
Raym. 427 (1699).
And Yelverton, arguing another case, says: "the reason why at first
the transcript is said to be sent only, is for fear it should be destroyed
by the sea in the carriage: but when such fear is.over by the safe arrival
of the record, and by the entry of it in the rolls here, then it ceases to
be a record in Ireland, and is a perfect record here." St. John v. Commyn,
Yelv. 117 (1608). And to the same effect see Bishop of Ossory's Case, Cro.
Jac. 534 (1620). For a 19th Century case showing confusion as to just
what the "record" really was, see Richardson v. Mellish, 3 Bing. 346
(1825).
27 For translations of the writ of error see TMD'S PRACTXcS (2d Am. ed.
1807) 1066; 1 HoLswoRTH, op. cit. supra note 22, at 654; 3 BrJAOSTOND
Comm. app. no. 3, § 6.
28 For other early statements of the rule in English Law, see Co. Lirr.
(1st Am. ed. 1853) 288b; 2 Wins. Saund. 100 (1671) BACON's An.,
tit. "Error", A, 2.
Practically all of the cases at Common Law laying down the rule dealt
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II
A complete picture of appellate processes in England in past
years cannot be obtained merely by consideration of the common
law courts. Much of the business now handled by our courts
of general jurisdiction was taken care of in England by chancery,
and we must, therefore, consider the procedure in those types
of cases.29
Taking Blackstone's time as a convenient point of departure,
we find that the course of litigation in a simple case in equity
went something as follows.3°
The pleadings having been filed and the parties at issue upon
the facts, the evidence was taken down in writing 31 and the
case set for hearing before the chancellor or the Master of the
Rolls. There the evidence was read and such orders made from
time to time as might be necessary. = When everything had
with disputes where damages remained to be assessed. Note that this was
so as to all of the cases cited in note 13, supra., except Humphrey Bohun's
case. Involving accompt, with judgment qiiod coynputet is Porter v. Ager,
Cro. Jac. 324 (1614). In the following cases error was held not to
lie because damages remained to be assessed: Russell and Prat's Case,
1 Leon. 193 (1570) (action on the case for conversion). Elkin v. Wastell,
3 Bulstr. 230 (1617) (action on the case for a promise). Bishop of
Glouc. v. Veale, Noy, 66 (1598) (in quarc impcdit).
In partition, error could not be brought on the judgment q2tod partitio
flat, but only on the final judgment, q:od partitio stabills sit. Ld. Barkley
v. Countess of Warwick, Cro. Eliz. 635 (1598). In ejectment, however,
error was allowed upon judgment qzod recuperet tcrininuni, although
damages have not been found. (The judgment quod rcezpcrct was the one
whereby the successful plaintiff was put in possession.) It is said that
the possession of the land is the principal thing in question in the suit.
Glide v. Dudeney, Style, 109 (1649). As to writs of dower, the cases
are conflicting. See Gleford v. Carr, 1 Brownl. 127 (1651) and an un-
named case in March, N. R. 88 (1642). The rule remained in force in Eng-
land until the Common Law Procedure Acts. See Samuel v. Judin, 6 East.
333, 336 (1805), per Ellenborough, L. J., "Error can only be brought on
final judgment."29 This of course still leaves out of account the admiralty and ecclesiastic
courts which at various times did a considerable business of a type now
handled by our courts of general jurisdiction. For the purposes of this
paper, however, I have thought it better not to take them up in detail,
as they have had practically no existence in this country, and such effect
as they may have had upon our procedure has been indirect only, through
equity and common law.
30 For a short outline of the procedure see 3 BLACKSTONE, ConM. 442-455.
Also 3 WOODDESSON, LECTuREs ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND (2d ed. 1834)
213-236. A more complete account is given in the many editions of DANIELL,
CHANCERY PLEADING AND PRACTICE.
1 This was done by means of written interrogatories to the witnesses
before examiners or commissioners authorized by the court for the purpose.
32 These might relate to various matters such as making an election
whether to sue at law or equity; orders for subpoenas; for adding de-
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been heard the decree was pronounced. Generally it was merely
interlocutory,33 but eventually the final decree was made and
the rights of the parties completely adjudicated.'
We see, then, that there were three types of pronouncements
made during the course of a case. First, orders, second, inter-
locutory decrees, and third, final decrees. 34 Unlike the common
law, however, which as we have seen, required a case to go to
final judgment before the decisions of the court might be ques-
tioned, equity gave relief from all three types of pronounce-
ments. If a party was dissatisfied by an order made during the
course of the proceedings his remedy was by way of rehearing
by petition to the Lord Chancellor, whether the cause had been
heard before that dignitary or before the Master of the Rolls.
On this rehearing the evidence is reread and any additional
evidence presented. From the decision on this rehearing an ap-
peal lay to the House of Lords.35
An interlocutory decree differed from an order in that it had
to be signed by the chancellor before it could be enrolled, and
prior to his signing it had qnly the force of an order. Therefore,
prior to signing relief was the same as in the case of an order,
namely, petition for a rehearing before the chancellor, and from
there appeal to the House of Lords. After a decree was signed
and enrolled, whether it was interlocutory or final, relief could
be had only by bill of review for an error in judgment appearing
on the face of the decree, or by special leave of the chancellor
upon the discovery of new evidence. From a decision on this
bill appeal might be taken to the House of Lords.30
fendants to a bill; to assign a guardian; to set down a demurrer for argu-
ment; to overrule a demurrer; to dissolve an injunction; for a master
to examine into the regularity of attachments; for a habeas corpus; to
cause a report to be made by a master, or to confirm the same; for a
subpoena duceg tecumr. Examples of. the form and content of all of the
above orders are given in 2 HARRISON, CHANCERY PRACTICE (1st Am.
ed. 1807) 139-149.
3 Of course, there were often a number of interlocutory decrees in
the same case, with orders interspersed throughout. Some common decrees
were as follows: for trial by jury of one or more issues, because "this
court is so sensible of the deficiency of trial by written depositions, that
it will not bind the parties thereby" (3 BLACKSTONE, Comm. 452); sub-
mission of questions of law to the common law courts, or reference made
to a master to settle accounts, and clear up "a hundred little facts" (ibid.
453), or to a commission to settle boundaries or arrange a partition.
34 This seems to be the conventional classification, but as a matter of fact
the distinction is not at all clear as between orders and interlocutory
decrees. Daniell, for instance, refers to "decretal orders." See 2 DANIELL,
op. cit. sutpra note 30. (Perkins ed. 1846) 1198. And see Horwood v.
Schmedes, 12 Ves. Jr. 311, 316 (1806).
35 BLACKSTONE, Comm. 454.
36 Ibid.
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Appeal 37 to the House of Lords, whether from an order or
from an interlocutory or final decree, was by petition to that
body, which, if it consented to hear the case, considered all the
documents and not merely the enrolled decree. 8
Thus we see that equity practice never knew the rule of the
common law that only final judgments were appealable. Not
only could interlocutory decrees be taken to the House of Lords,
but also those decisions which had not even attained the dignity
of -decrees, that is, orders. As to the reason for this, we may
tentatively assign two factors. First, appeals to the House of
Lords from the Lord Chancellor were established comparatively
late in legal history. The chancery had come to be regarded as a
court as early as the 14th or 15th Century,39 but appeals to the
House of Lords did not become established until the latter half
of the 17th Century.4 During the intervening centuries, there-
fore, a given case had its beginning and ending in the same
/ court,41 and the only method by which a decision could be altered
was by rehearing before the chancellor.4- That he reviewed all
interlocutory decrees and orders made by masters in chancery
-may be explained historically, as originally the chancellor was
the sole judge in chancery, and the masters were regarded as
mere clerks rather than judges.43 Even in Blackstone's time a
decree was a decree of the chancellor and not of the master who
really gave it, since before it could become effective as a decree
it had to be signed by the chancellor.4
When the House of Lords finally asserted appellate jurisdic-
tion over proceedings in chancery, therefore, it found a system
whereby the chancellor passed on all decrees issued, as well as on
interlocutory orders, and we need not be surprised that appeals
were taken to the Lords from interlocutory decrees because in
chancery there was no particular magic in a final decree. All
were, so as to speak, of equal dignity. We might expect, how-
ever, that while appeals from all decrees would be heard, there
might be some doubt as to the appealability of mere orders. This
7 The reference is now to "appeal" in the technical sense.
'Is Thus, it considered thd evidence already taken down, but no new
evidence was admitted. Keen v. Stuckely, Gilb. Rep. 155 (1721).
zo 1 HoLDswoRTH, op. cit. supra note 22, at 403.
4o Mid., 372.
41 See 1 SPENCE, EQUITABLE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF CHANCE IY
(1846) 393.
42A very few cases show that it was possible to get an Act of Parlia-
ment to reverse a decision of the Chancellor. 1 Howswortm, op. cit.
supra note 22, at 373. Also by petition to the King to appoint commis-
sioners td rehear the case. Ibid.; Vawdrey's Case, 1 Rolle Rep. 331 (1616).
43 1 HomswoRT 416; 4 COKE, INsT. 84; 1 SPENCE, op. cit. supra note
41, at 357.
-" 3 BLACKSTONE ComIm. 453.
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supposition is borne out by Spence, who says that it was not until
1726 that appellate jurisdiction was established over inter-
locutory orders.45
Second, when we consider the character of litigation handled
in chancery we see how much more convenient it was to review
intermediate decisions as the case progressed. Equity cases were
those of which the chancellor had taken cognizance because there
was no adequate remedy at law. Consequently much of its liti-
gation was of a complicated type unsuited to the more simple
common law forms of action. There was a much greater use
of subordinate officials than in the common law courts, and the
requirement of documentation of evidence introduced difficulties
unkn6wn to the King's courts. In equity, judgments were not
compelled to follow stereotyped forms, and this made possible
dealing with the case by as many orders, decrees, and modifica-
tions of the same as were necessary in the particular case. Thus,
equity had a more elastic procedure, and also required a less
rigid practice on appeal to review the many and varied steps
taken below. 40
III
When we pass to the American scene we are at once confronted
with confusion. The almost complete lack of historical research
in American legal history makes it difficult, if not impossible,
to trace with any accuracy the breaking up of the old English
system of dual appeals into the conglomerate mass which con-
stitutes our modern appellate procedure. However, two main
trends seem to have characterized the process.
First, there has been a general tendency to take the common
law rule that error lay only after final judgment and to apply
it to equity procedure. Second, hampered by this restriction in
both law and equity, the courts have gone through elaborate
logical exercises in order to escape from the strict application
of the restriction, so that, as Coke said, "for the most part, every
particular case which has been ruled in the said books may well
stand upon a several and particular reason.1147
Taking up first the adoption of the common law rule into
45,1 SPENCE, op. cit. supra note 41, at 395, n. (e). The author cites
COOPER, PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT (1828) 161, but it is uncertain
whether the citation refers to this particular point. A search through all
chancery appeals to the House of Lords decided in 1726 fails to disclose
any assertion of such jurisdiction. Likewise, a cursory examination of all
such appeals up to 1800 discloses very few from what may be termed
orders. Practically all are from interlocutory or final decrees.
46Note the comparison between common law and equity procedure in
1 SPENCE, op. cit. supra note 41, at 389.
4 See 11 Co. 40b, 41a.
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equity, we find that this was accomplished by statute very early
in the judicial history of a number of jurisdictions. Thus, the
first federal judiciary act of 1789 provided for appeals from
"final judgments or decrees" only.48 Ten years earlier, however,
the Virginia statute setting up the court of appeals provided
for an appeal from the lower court "after those decisions shall
be final there." 49  In Maryland the earliest statutes provided
for appeals from "decretal orders," 51 but this was construed to
mean about the same thing as final decree,5 1 and a number of
years later a statute declared that appeals in equity should be
from "final decrees" only.U2 In Ohio, likewise, it was early en-
acted that appeals might be only from "any final sentence or
decree made in any cause in chancery." 53 In Missouri, on the
other hand, a statute providing for chancery appeals when a
party was "dissatisfied with the determination or decree" was
construed to mean final decree only, by analogy with the statute
applying to appeals at law."
48 1 STAT. 72 (1789). The limitation appeared in three different sec-
tions of the*Act. Section 25 provided for appeals from the highest state
courts to the Supreme Court; Section 22 for appeals from district courts
to circuit courts, and Section 21 related to appeals in admiralty and mari-
time eases.
Why the statute so limited appeals must remain somewhat of a mystery.
The debates in Congress for that period are too meagrely reported to be of
much assistance, and although Section 25 was under considerable fire re-
garding the feature of appeals from state courts, no mention is made of
the final judgment feature. See 1 ANNALS or CONO. 47, 51; Also Warren,
New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 (1923)
37 HARv. L. REv. 49. Oliver Ellsworth, later Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, is generally regarded as mainly responsible for the Act. Ibid.;
WARREN, HISTORY OF THE AtEpmcAN BAR (1911) 240.
49 Act of (May), 1779 (c. 22, 10 STAT. LARG. 89). See further the
Court of Appeal Law of (Oct.) 1792, VA. REV. CODE (1794) G7 c. 11, 13
STAT. LAnG. 406 (1792). Also it may be noted that the act constituting
the state Court of Admiralty of 1779 (c. 26, 10 STAT. LAna. 101) pro-
vides for an appeal from a "final sentence" of that court. See also Act
of 1792 (13 STAT. LARG. 406), § 14. The foregoing are reviewed in
McCall v. Peachy, 5 Va. 48 (1798). For further modifications of the early
Virginia law, see infra note 66.
5 Act of 1785, c. 72. Also see Act of 1818, c. 193.
1 Hagthorp v. Hook's Adm'rs, 1 Gill & J. 270 (Md. 1829).
52 Act of 1830, c. 185. And see Hatton v. Weems, 10 Gill & J. 377 (Ald.
1839). For later modifications of the Maryland law see mufra note 66.
-3 29 Ohio Laws 90 (1830). This was construed to forbid an appeal
from a decree for the sale of mortgaged premises in a foreclosure pro-
ceeding. Baker v. Lehman, Wright 522 (Ohio, 1834), citing the Federal
Judiciary Act and a federal case decided thereunder.
5 Tanner v. Irwin, 1 Mo. 65 (1821). In Delaware the English Chancery
practice was adhered to by the Constitution of 1792, by which the High
Court of Errors and Appeals was given jurisdiction "to receive and
determine appeals from interlocutory or final decrees of the Chancellor".
Del. Laws, xliv. And see Tatem v. Gilpin, 1 Del. Ch. 13 (1816).
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Another factor which may have had some effect was the
failure to keep distinct the practice of law and equity, particu-
larly on appeal. Very commonly one appellate court was estab-
lished to hear appeals in both law and equity, and in some states,
at least, the common law writ of error was the method of appeal
in equity cases as well as at law.5 Such a situation could only
result in the confusion of the appellate practice in those juris-
dictions.
We may believe further, perhaps, that there wag some re-
luctance on the part of the courts of appeal of those early days
to decide questions of comparatively little importance, such as
those generally brought up on interlocutory appeals."0 This had
doubtless been a factor at all times in the development of the
rule and when congestion of dockets began to be felt it was
reinforced by a stronger element, namely, the fear that if inter-
locutory appeals were heard it would result in the court being
swamped with appeals. The merits of this belief will be dis-
cussed later; here it suffices merely to set out the fact as one
of the influences which may have tended to make the final judg-
ment rule applicable to all cases. In England we find no men-
tion of it, but its influence in the development of our procedure
can hardly be denied. Whether it appears coincident with a con-
gested docket, or whether it was at first simply one of those
"imaginary horrors" which the courts are prone to conjure up
from time to time is uncertain, due to the lack of statistics as
55 Thus, in the United States Supreme Court we find the following:
"The court decided that the removal of suits from the Circuit Court
into the Supreme Court must be by writ of error in every case, what-
ever may be the original nature of the suits." Blaine v. Ship Chas, Carter,
4 Dall. 22 (U. S. 1800). In Alabama a writ of error which had been
prosecuted from an interlocutory decree dissolving an injunction wag
quashed because the decision was not final. Johnson's Admr. v. Henry's
Ex., Minor 13 (Ala. 1820). And see Glover v. Robinson, Minor 101 (Ala.
1822). The same practice was current in Kentucky. See Carland v. Irwin,
2 Ky. 1 (1801). In fact, the entire American field of appellate practice
has tended to become more and more like the English procedure in error.
Not only is a limitation of appeal to the final judgment the rule, but the
nature of the review in most states is one of looking for errors on the
record rather than considering all the facts in the case as in the old
equity appeal. See Sunderland, The Problem of Appellate Review (1926)
5 TEx. L. Ruv. 126.
56 It is also interesting to note in this connection Dean Pound's sug-
gestion that there was considerable need directly after the Revolution to
clarify and to state the extent to which the common law was to be applied
to the American scene. As a result the emphasis in the judicial system
was upon appellate courts as instruments to lay down rules of law (see
Pound, Organization of Courts (1916) 6 BuLL. AMEIR. JUD. SOO. 1), and
as such there must have been comparative reluctance to bother with
intermediate appeals; the business of declaring the law could best be done
by considering only final judgments.
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to the appellate dockets in the early state courts. We do know
something, however, through the work of Professors Frank-
furter and Landis, of the work of the United States Supreme
Court in its early days. Speaking of the years immediately
following the first judicial act (1789), they say: "The volume
of appellate business did not yet call for relief of the Supreme
Court by limiting its appellate jurisdiction." r, During this
period it is instructive to note that the cases laying down the
rule are content merely to assert it,:i or to cite statutory au-
thority.r 9 There is no attempt to give a moral justification.
The next forty years, however, showed a steady increase in
the business activity of the country, and consequently in the busi-
ness of the court. The duties of the justices were complicated
by the circuit court system whereby the individual justices were
supposed to ride the circuit and sit at trials in those courts. As
a consequence they became greatly overworked, and many efforts
were made to induce Congress to work out a better system of
organization. ° Whether it be a coincidence merely, or whether
there was some causal connection, it appears that in 1830, when
congestion was increasing at a rapid rate, Mr. Justice Story
discovered that the provisions of the Act of 1789 had been all
wise and far seeing in that they tended to discourage excessive
appeals. He writes:
"It is of great importance to the due administration of justice,
and is in the furtherance of the manifest intention of the legis-
lature, in giving appellate jurisdiction to this court upon final
judgments only, that causes should not come up here in frag-
ments, upon successive appeals. It would occasion very great
delays, and oppressive expenses." -
Five years later, to Mr. Chief Justice Marshall the matter has
assumed the importance of "a policy which forbids writs of error
or appeals until the judgment or decree be final," '- while by
Taney's time we know that "it was obviously the object of the
law to save the unnecessary expense and delay of repeated ap-
peals in the same suit." 3
57 Frankfurter and Landis, The Businiess of the Stiprcme Cotirt (1925)
38 HARv. L. nv. 1005, 1017.
rBRutherford v. Fisher, 4 Dall. 22 (U. S. 1800); Young v. Grundy, 6
Cranch 51 (U. S. 1810); Gibbons v. Ogden, 6 'Wheat. 448 (U. S. 1821);
Kitchen v. Strawbridge, Fed. Cas. 7854 (C. C. Pa. 1821).
59 Ray v. Law, 3 Cranch 179 (U. S. 1805) ; Houston v. Boore, 3 Wheat.
433 (U. S. 1818).60 Frankfurter and Landis, op. cit. sitpra note 57, at 1049.
61 Canter, Admx. v. Amer. Ins. Co., 3 Peters 307, 318 (U. S. 1830).
6 U. S. v. Bailey, 9 Peters 272, 273 (U. S. 1835).
63 Forgay v. Conrad, 6 How. 201 (U. S. 1848), per Taney, C. J. This




The basic principle, then, in practically all jurisdictions in this
country is that only final judgments are appealable." When
we have said this, however, we have not told the whole story.
courts. For example, "If every interlocutory order ...be made the sub-
ject of appeal ... it would lead to an endless source of litigation." Roberts
v. Stagg, 1 Nott & Me. 429 (S. C. 1819). And "the delay occasioned by
allowing an appeal in every such case would be intolerable". Robertson
v. Bingley, 1 McCord, Eq. 333 (S. C. 1826). Also, "it is easy to perceive
that appeals from orders of this description might be productive of great
inconvenience and vexatious delays". Snowden v. Dorsey, 6 Har. & J. 114,
116 (Md. 1825). Also see Joslyn v. Sappington, 1 Tenn. 222 (1806).
A refreshing protest is found in the opinion of Hosmer, C. J., of the
Connecticut court, dissenting to a decision of the court that an order
granting a new trial is not a final judgment. Magill v. Lyman, 6 Conn.
59 (1825). See infra note 128.
64 In practically all jurisdictions today the subject is regulated by statute,
and in most instances the rule has been modified to some extent.
Many jurisdictions allow interlocutory appeals from certain enumerated
decisions or in particular kinds of actions. This is true of the procedure
in the federal courts. See 43 STAT. 936, 937, 938 (1925) 28 U. S. C.
§§ 225c, 227, 345 (1926); also 43 STAT. 936 (1925), 11 U. S. C. §§ 47,
48a (1928). It is true, also, of probably a majority of state statutes,
among which see the following: MISS. COoE ANN. (1930) § 14; MASS.
GEN. LAws (1921) c. 231, § 96; 1 Wis. STAT. (1929) 274.09; W. VA. CODs
(1931) c. 58, art. 5, § 1; VA. CODS (1930) c. 267, § 6336. S. D. COMP.
LAWS (1929) § 3168; OKLA. CoMP. STAT. (1921) c. 3, art, 25, § 780 (2);
S. C.'CoDn CIv. PROC. (1922), tit. 1, art. 2, §§ 1 (d) 2, 4; N. Y. CIv. PItAo.
ACT. (Cahill, 1928) §§ 609, 610, 611; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon 1930)
§§ 1093, 1097, 1101, 1102, 1104, 1108.
In addition to such specific exceptions to the general rule, the statutes
in a few jurisdictions gave a certain amount of discretion either to the
trial or to the appellate court as an alternative to appeal from the final
judgment only. D. C. CODE (1929) tit. 18, § 26; MISS. CODS: ANN. (1930)
§ 14; CODE TENN. (1932) § 938, applying to certain equity cases only.
Still another type of act allows appeal where the decision in the lower
court "determines the action" or "prevents a judgment or decree". 1 Wis.
STAT. (1929) 274.09; S. D. ComIr. LAWS (1929) § 3168V OxLA. Coir.
STAr. (1921) c. 3, art. 25, § 781; S. C. CODE (1922) tit. 1, art. 2, § 1 (d)
2; N. Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT. (Cahill, 1928) § 609; CODE OF 01I0 (Throck-
morton, 1930, Baldwin's Rev.) § 12, 258
Some of these jurisdictions also allow appeals where the decision com-
plained of "affects a substantial right". 1 WIS. STAT. (1929) 274.09; CANS.
REv. STAT. (1923) 60:3303; S. D. Comp. LAws (1929) §. 3168; OnLA.
Comp. STAT. (1921) c. 3, art. 25, § 781; S. C. CODE (1922) tit. 1, art. 2,
§ 1 (d), 2, 3; N. Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT (Cahill, 1928) § 609 (4); CODE OF
OHIO (Throckmorton, 1930, Baldwin's Rev.) § 12, 258.
Other variations permit a review where the decision "adjudicates the
principles of the case". W. VA. CODE (1931) c. 58, art. 5 § 1 (g); VA.
CODE (1930) c. 267, § 6336; or "involves the merits". S. D. Coran LAWS
(1929) § 3168; OKLA. Co aP. STAT. (1921) c. 3, art. 25, § 780 (3); S. C.
CODE Cxv. PRoc. (1922) tit. 1, art. 2, § 1 (d) 1. N. Y. Crv. Pam. ACT
.(Cahill, 5th ed.) § 609 (3).
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In simple actions such as those which composed most of the
litigation before the original common law courts, when the case
is begun and finished in a short time, the limitation of appeal
to the last or final judgment works with a fair degree of con-
venience, but when confronted with a long and complicated case
such as often characterized the old chancery litigation, it breaks
down completely. Rights of the palties may be gravely jeop-
ardized or destroyed if it is necessary to wait until the entire case
has been disposed of below. If we take, for instance, an action
for partition, we find there are generally many orders and de-
crees made during the course of the proceedings. It is often
necessary to decide whether to admit or exclude parties; decrees
must be made for appraisement, sale, confirmation of sale, and
distribution of proceeds. Again, where there is a petition for
and granting of a receivership for a business, the case may be
under the control of the court for years, and obviously an appeal
only from the decree winding up the case is worthless.05
As a result of this situation a number of escapes from the
restriction have grown up. In addition to statutory modification
in some states,6 6 the principal method seems to have been the
r5 Note Forgay v. Conrad, 6 How. 201 (U. S. 1848), in which Chief
Justice Taney finds it necessary to warn the circuit courts of the danger
of canceling deeds and ordering property sold or delivered prior to the
final judgments. The difficulty did not arise in England, he says, because
appeals might be taken from interlocutory decrees in chancery.
66 Supra, note 64. This tendency to make certain statutory exceptions
to the rule began very early in a number of states. Thus in Virginia, by
the Act of 1797, the earlier statute allowing appeals from final judgments
only (supra note 49) was modified to allow the chancellor to grant appeals
at his discretion from interlocutory decrees made by him. 1 VA. Ru,. CODE,
(1803) c. 223, at 375. Also see an act of Feb. 1816, c. 66, § 57, REV. CODE,
(1819), wherein further exceptions were made. Some of these early stat-
utes are discussed in Bowyer v. Lewis, 11 Va. 553 (1807), and in Pres. &
Prof. & Masters of Win. & Mary College v. Hodgson, 12 Va. 557 (1808).
In Maryland, the Act of 1830 (supra note 52) providing for appeals
from final decrees only, was amended by an act of 1841 (c. 11), providing
for immediate appeals from any decree or order for the sale, conveyance
or delivery of real or personal property. The act was probably passed as
a result of the case of Lee v. Pindle, 11 Gill. & J. 362 (Md. 1840), which
held that an appeal could not be taken from an order of sale of slaves,
when a decree for distribution of the proceeds was yet to be made. In
this connection see also Dugan v. Gittings, 3 Gill. 138 (Md. 1845).
In Massachusetts a statute of 1782 (c. 11, section 2), provided that "any
party aggrieved at the judgment of the C. P. upon any action may appeal
therefrom to the next Supreme Judicial Court." This was interpreted to
allow appeals from final judgments only. Tappan v. Bruen, 5 Mass. 193
(1809). By an act of 1784 (c. 27, sec. 8), an appeal was given from
judgments of respondeat ouster on a plea in abatement, and from a judg-
ment for plaintiff on demurrer to the declaration. A statute of 1785
(c. 47) gave an appeal from the judgment quod cemputet in account, and
that of 1786 (c. 53) from judgment quod partiti fiat in partition. Note
these are all common law judgments.
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use of extraordinary remedies in the shape of writs of man-
damus, prohibition, certiorari, and habeas corpus.0 7
Extraordinary remedies have long been recognized by appel-
late tribunals as means of controlling and superintending the
work of the trial courts. As one court has put it, "the writs
already named form a veritable arsenal of legal weapons by
means of which all ordinary excesses or defaults on the part of
inferior courts which call for the exercise of such power can be
corrected and controlled." 68
Mandtmus. At common law a mandamus issued from Xing's
Bench and might go to any inferior court requiring them to do
some particular thing "which the King's Bench has previously
determined, or, at least supposes to be consonant to right and
justice." 619 Its character as an escape was recognized by Lord
Mansfield, who said,' "When there is no specific remedy the
court will grant a mandamus that justice may be done," 10 and
this dictum is re-enforced by a long line of American authority
beginning with Marberry v. Madison.71 On the other hand, it
has often been said that the writ will not lie to review inter-
locutory proceedings,72 but the joker in the trick is that most
courts make an exception when the order complained of has
In Louisiana the modern statute allowing appeals where irreparable
injury might result seems to have had its origin in early decisions. See
Enet v. His Creditors, 4 Mart. 307 (1816), and State v. Judge Lewls, 9
Mart. 301 (1821).
07There has also been some escape by way of refinement of the term
"final" to include orders which would seem not to be such in the ordinary
sense of the term. The following "final decisions" are given not as ex-
amples of what is ordinarily held in like instances, but merely by way
of illustration of the refinements which are employed to secure appeal in
particular cases: order directing arbitration, Marchant v. Mead-Morrison
Mfg. Co., 252 N. Y. 284, 169 N. E. 386 (1929); order to pay alimony
pendente lite, Gould v. Gould, 95 Pa. Super. Ct. 387 (1928) ; order directing
defendant to answer interrogatories contained in plaintiff's bill of discovery,
Samuels v. Finkelstein, 25 S. W. (2d) 923 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930); order
overruling demurrer to defense in the answer, Coleman v. Coleman, 142 Xy.
36, 133 S. W. 1003 (1911); order overruling demurrer to complaint, Mayor
of Hyattsville v. Smith, 105 Md. 318, 66 Atl. 44 (1907); order refusing
to dismiss attachment, Mitchell v. Eliz. River Lmb. Co., 169 N. C. 397, 80
S. E. 363 (1915); order releasing attachment bond, De Beam v. Do Beam,
119 Md. 418, 86 Atl. 1049 (1913); order refusing change of venue,
Carpenter v. Cent. Vt. R. R., 84 Vt. 538, 80 Atl. 657 (1911).
0S State v. Johnson, 103 Wis. 591, 615, 79 N. IV. 1081, 1088 (1899).
69 3 BLACKSTONE, Coimi. 110.
70 Rex v. Bank of England, 2 Dougl. 524 (1780).
711 Cranch 137 (U. S. 1803).
72 Ex parte Wagner, 249 U. S. 465, 39 Sup. Ct. 317 (1919). Co1a:
Johnson v. Gerald, 216 Ala. 581, 113 So. 447 (1927), where it Is said that
mandamus is the proper method to review an interlocutory order In a
divorce suit fixing alimony pendente lite.
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been issued without "jurisdiction." 3
As an example of this use, we find the courts granting man-
damus to review orders granting or refusing changes of venue,'T4
declining to make persons parties to suits,-- and granting or
refusing intervention.76 Again, we find it granted to correct the
error of the trial court in removing a case to the equity side of
the CoUrt, 77 to compel a judge to require a witness to testify, 8
and to give relief against the wrongful appointment of an audi-
tor to simplify questions for a jury.7- All these orders against
which the writ was granted are clearly interlocutory and not
final in the ordinary sense of the term, so that we have in the
writ a clear escape whereby interlocutory orders of the trial
court may be reviewed without doing technical violence to the
final judgment rule.
Prohibition. This was a writ issuing out of King's Bench
"directed to the judge and parties of a suit in any inferior court,
commanding them to cease from the prosecution of [some suit]
upon a suggestion that either the cause originally or some col-
lateral matter arising therein, does not belong to that jurisdic-
tion, but to the cognizance of some other court," 81 it being gen-
erally familiar as the writ whereby the courts of common law
asserted superiority over ecclesiastical and admiralty courts.84
Its use as an escape from the final judgment rule is shown
plainly by such instances as its allowance to a party whose lien
on property was displaced by an order directing the sale of it
free from liens, since to wait until final judgment to appeal
would have lost him his right.,- Again, it is said that the writ
will lie to correct a refusal to change venue, since an appeal
from the final judgment would be valueless 8 3 It has likewise
been used to correct an order of the trial court requiring the
prosecutor to permit the accused to inspect a memorandum of
evidence,84 as well as to correct the refusal of the lower court
73 People v. Smith, 275 Ill. 210, 113 N. E. 891 (1916).
'74 State v. Pac. County Super. Ct., 82 Wash. 614, 144 Pac. 898 (1914);
State v. Waseco County Dist. Ct., 150 Blinn. 498, 185 N. W. 1019 (1921);
State v. Sup. Ct., 55 Wash. 328, 104 Pac. 607 (1909); State v. De Baun,
198 Ind. 661, 154 N. E. 492 (1926).
7 5 Ex parte Connaway, 178 U. S. 421, 20 Sup. Ct. 951 (1900).
76 Ex parte Breedlove, 118 Ala. 172, 24 So. 363 (1898); Riverside Iron
Works v. Hosmer, 100 Mlich. 124, 58 N. W. 693 (1894).
- Ex parte Simmons, 247 U. S. 231, 38 Sup. Ct. 497 (1918).
78 Woolley v. Wight, 65 Utah 619, 238 Pac. 1114 (1925).
79 Ex parte Peterson, 253 U. S. 300, 40 Sup. Ct. 543 (1920).
80 3 BLACKSTONE, Comi. 112.
811 HoLDswoRTH, 229, 553, 558, 594-5.
8-2 Oldroyd v. McCrea, 65 Utah 142, 235 Pac. 580 (1925).
83 State v. Super. Ct., 97 Wash. 358, 166 Pac. 630 (1917).
84 People v. Sup. Ct., 245 N. Y. 24, 156 N. E. 84 (1927).
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to dismiss a prosecution on the motion of the county attorney."
Another instance is its use to correct an instruction of the court
to commissioners who are about to assess property in eminent
domain proceedings.""
Certiorri. This writ presents a problem slightly different
from the two just discussed. Originally it issued out of chancery
or King's Bench, ordering the record to be sent up "to the end
the party may have more speedy justice." 87 At common law,
apparently, it was employed chiefly in three types of cases. First,
to bring up an indictment before trial in order to pass on its
validity, or to insure a fair trial. Second, as a "quasi-writ of
error" to review judgments of inferior courts, particularly those
proceeding other than according to the course of the common
law, from which error did not lie. Third, to bring up out
branches of the record on matters omitted on the return of the
writ of error.8
In this country, however, its character in many jurisdictions
has been greatly changed. Because of its discretionary character
it has been used as an instrument to secure discretionary appeals
in some cases 19 and when used as a substitute for a writ of
error in this way it has been widely held that it cannot be sued
out until final judgment.90 That it is still used to some extent
as an escape from the rule, however, we see from cases holding
that it will be issued to review failure to allow Ev change of
venue,9' to review an order removing an administrator,"2 and to
correct an order directing a receiver to sell where the super-
sedeas bond on appeal could not be executed in time to prevent
the sale. 3 Its character as an escape has been frankly recog-
nized in a number of cases as where it is said that certiorari
85 Foley v. Ham, 102 Kan. 66, 169 Pac. 183 (1917).
86 Peters v. Buckner, 288 Mo. 618, 232 S. W. 1024 (1921).
87 BACON'S ABRIDGMENT, Certiorari (a).
88 Hartranft v. Mollowny, 247 U. S. 295, 38 Sup. Ct. 518 (1918); Cf.
4 BLACKSTONE, Comm. 320, in which most of the discussion relates to its
use in bringing up the indictment in criminal cases.
89 See cases cited, 28 U. S. C. A. 347 (1928) and also 2 SPELLINO,
EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF (1901) § 1914.
90 Gurnilla v. Industrial Accident Comm., 187 Cal. 638, 203 Pac. 397
(1921); State v. Dist. Ct., 134 Minn. 435, 159 N. W. 965 (1916). For
further cases see those cited in 11 C. T. 126, note 62. Also see same volume,
§ 76 and citations.
9' Carpenter v. Cent. Vt. R. R., 84 Vt. 538, 80 AtI. 657 (1911). Note
that orders involving changes of venue, which are clearly interlocutory,
have been reviewed by mandamus (note 74), prohibition (note 83), and
now certiorari, although in the first two instances it was because ordinary
appeal from the final judgment would be valueless, while in the Carpenter
case certiorari is allowed because the order is deemed a final judgment.
92 Haddick v. Dist. Ct., 160 Iowa 487, 141 N. W. 925 (1913).
93 State v. Super. Ct., 110 Wash. 559, 188 Pac. 384 (1920).
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may be used to review interlocutory decrees where irreparable
injury would result by waiting to appeal from the final decree.0'
Habeas Corpus. It is often said that habeas corpus is not a
substitute for an appeal or writ of error,03 but these statements
are generally made in cases which have gone to final judgment,
and were therefore appealable by the regular method. Like man-
damus or prohibition it is made use of when the lower court
has exceeded its jurisdiction, and thus is open to use to free
persons prior to final disposition of the case. Thus it will lie
before conviction when an information fails entirely to show
any offense under the statute which defendant is said to have
violated,96 and to test the jurisdiction of the committing magi-
strate.97 Moreover, when there is no legal evidence that a crime
has been committed, or that the prisoner has committed one, he
is entitled to the writ.,, These are familiar enough examples
of the use of the writ to release in advance of trial persons
wrongfully held in custody, and as such, it is a clear escape from
the rule requiring a final judgment before appeal can be taken.
V
I have noted heretofore that it is generally thought that the
rule requiring final judgments before appeals can be taken was
invoked in order to prevent congestion in the appellate courtP9
If we assume that no restriction at all would result in a mul-
tiplicity of appeals, and if we assume further that restriction is
always desirable, it still remains to be seen whether attempting
to restrict them by a rule requiring final judgments is at all
successful. It is true that to some extent it prevents a case from
being presented for review in fragments but, on the other hand,
it has caused protracted and repeated litigation over the ques-
tion of what judgments and orders are final. As Professor
Sunderland has put it:
"There is one thing to be said in favor of no restrictions at
all,-it will save an immense amount of useless litigation over
the question whether parties may or may not appeal particular
94AMacKenzie v. R. I. Hospital Trust Co., 45 R. I. 407, 122 Atl. 774
(1923); cf. Lavoy v. Toye Bros., 159 La. 209, 105 So. 292 (1925), -wherein
it is said that certiorari and prohibition are proper methods of attacking
proceedings outside the jurisdiction of the lower court, appeal not always
being adequate.
9 5 McMicking v. Schields, 238 U. S. 99, 107, 25 Sup. Ct. 665, 667.96 Ex parte Garvey, 84 Fla. 583, 94 So. 381 (1922).
97 People v. Snell, 216 N. Y. 527, 111 N. E. 50 (1916).
98 State v. Huegin, 110 Wis. 189, 85 N. W. 1046 (1901); Comm. v.
Shorthall, 206 Pa. St. 165, 55 Atl. 952 (1903).
99 Supra part I.
1932]
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cases. Every restriction to ward off appeals creates litigation
over the force and effect of the restriction itself. Machinery to
save labor may become so complex as to waste more labor than
it saves." 100
It would not be surprising if this be true of the final judgment
rule. What is sought to be accomplished is to label a definite
point in a given case as "final," and to allow appeals only when
that point has been reached. This procedure necessarily involves
a satisfactory definition of "final" which will be recognizable with
a minimum of uncertainty, and which, when applied to the case
at hand will yield information as to whether that final stage
has been reached. The difficulty lies just at this point. In law,
as in any other field, the value of any definition in so far as it
aids in classifying or describing specific facts or cases, varies
inversely to its degree of generality. Yet when we say that only
final judgments are appealable we are assuming that all the law,
the entire corpus juris, can be brought under a single definition,
which, when applied to a given case, will disclose automatically
whether the desired stage in its progress has been reached.
These considerations, then, should prepare us for the large
volume of litigation over the question of what constitutes a final
judgment,' and we should not be surprised at the spectacle of a
labor saving device which causes more labor than it saves. We
are really seeking to determine whether this is the sort of de-
cision which the appellate court wishes to hear, but we spend ouir
time arguing the question of whether the decision is a final
judgment. As the number of cases increase, generalizations
which were used in past times must be reformulated, or cast
aside for new ones which are yet more vague or which contain
words capable of more than one meaning. Thus we create ma-
chines within machines in order to exclude or include given
sets of cases as the situation may require. And since so many
different kinds of cases are included in these generalizations,
learned counsel are able to parade a vast army of decisions for
the edification of the court, although the subject matter involved
in them is entirely different from the case which is being
argued.1o°
As an illustration of this procedure, a recent case in the fed-
eral courts is very much in point.10 2 Th, appeal was from the
denial of a motion for an order reviving and continuing an action
to recover damages sustained through unlawful combination and
100 Sunderland, The Problem of Appellate Review, op. cit. supra noto 55,
at 127.
101 See Professor Arnold's treatment of this tendency in another field.
Criminal Attempts-The Rise and Fall of an Abstraction (1930) 40 YALS
L. J. 53.
102 Sullivan v. Associated Billposters, 6 F. (2d) 1000 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925).
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conspiracy among the defendants, resulting in the destruction of
plaintiff's business. The motion sought to revive the action
against the executors of a defendant who had died after the
action was brought. The plaintiff in error sought to convince
the court that the motion was appealable by the citation, inter
alia, of the following cases in which the decisions indicated were
held to be final: '03 an order committing a witness for con-
tempt,1"0 a decree in a foreclosure suit of a railroad fixing com-
pensation of a trustee; 105 an order allowing a district attorney to
take custody of exhibits used in a civil suit in order to use them
against the witness in a criminal prosecution; 1O a decree award-
ing costs and execution thereon rendered in a mortgage fore-
closure;: an award of compensation to a receiver for the past
years services in a proceeding to wind up a partnership; s a
decree conditionally dissolving an attachment in an action at
law in which a third party intervened alleging that the attached
property was held in trust for the intervenor; 110 a decree dis-
missing a bill as to one of two copyrights in an action to restrain
enfringement; "- and an order making a temporary injunction
permanent in an action by a receiver in a judgment creditor's
suit to restrain a city from passing a resolution forfeiting a
charter'
But not only does a given case often have a fine variety of
antecedents, but its results may be even more surprising. At
the risk of prolonging the sport unduly, let us survey some of
the bastard progeny of one of the leading cases defining a final
judgment, McGoztrkey v. Toledo & Ohio Ry.11- Thiis case did
not involve the concept of the final judgment in connection with
an appeal. The problem there was whether in a mortgage fore-
closure of a railroad, turning property over to a receiver was a
final decree which the court could not disturb by a subsequent
decree. When we examine the cases in which it has been cited,
however, we find that its definition of a final judgment for the
purpose of determining whether a decree may be altered after
the expiration of the term, is used to define a final judgment for
the purpose of determining when an appeal will lie.13 The many
103 See epitomized brief of counsel, 42 A. L. R. 505 (1926).
104 Butler v. Fayerweather, 91 Fed. 458 (C. C. A. 2d, 1899).
115 Williams v. Morgan, 111 U. S. 684, 4 Sup. Ct. 638 (1884).
'06Perlman v. U. S., 247 U. S. 7, 38 Sup. Ct. 417 (1918).
107 In re Michigan Central R. R. 124 Fed. 727 (C. C. A. 6th, 1903).
' 
0 8 Ruggles v. Patton, 143 Fed. 312 (C. C. A. 6th, 1906).
109 McDermott v. Hayes, 197 Fed. 129 (C. C. A. 1st, 1912).
"ID Hist. Pub. Co. v. Jones Bros. 231 Fed. 784 (C. C. A. 3d, 191C).
'1 Gas & Elec. Sec. Co. v. Man. & Queens Trac. Corp., 266 Fed. 025
(C. C. A. 2d, 1920).
112 146 U. S. 536, 13 Sup. Ct. 170 (1892).
113 An interesting example of this practice of confusing a final judgment
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different situations brought under the same rule should also be
noted in the following cases, each of which held the order or
decree involved not to be final: appointment of commissioners
in condemnation proceedings; 114 an order for seizure and sale of
mortgaged land under executory process in Louisiana; "I a
decree which determined that a partnership existed and that
one partner was entitled to a share of the profits, but which
referred the case to a master to state an account; "10 an order of
an appellate court directing the trial court to enter an order
prayed for by an intervenor that plaintiff in an action against
the officers of a bank turn over to the intervenor the money and
stock paid by defendants to plaintiffs in settlement of that suit,
but providing that plaintiff should have 'costs and attorney's
fees; "' and a decree in a suit to enjoin collection of a tax re-
straining collection for years prior to 1900, but reserving for
further consideration those levied in 1900 and thereafter.118
Up to this point, therefore, I have sought to show that, as-
suming restriction of appeals to be desirable in all cases, the
concept of the final judgment is wholly unsatisfactory as a
for the purpose of determining appellability with a final judgment for
the purpose of determining whether it is within the power of the court
making the order to change it, is seen in 2 R. C. L. § 22, at 40. There, in
connection with appeal it is said that a final judgment is one that operates
"to divest some right in such a manner as to put it out of the power of
the court making the order to place the parties in their original condition
after the expiration of the term." Incidentally, if we turn to 15 R. C. L,,
§ 129, at 678, for help in determining when the court may or may not
place the parties in their original position, we are told that it is only a
final judgment which cannot be so amended.
114Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 147 U. S. 337, 13 Sup. Ct. 3506
(1893).
115 Fleitas v. Richardson, 147 U. S. 538, 13 Sup. Ct. 429 (1893).
116 Latta v. Kilbourn, 150 U. S. 524, 14 Sup. Ct. 201 (1893).
117 Calif. Nat. Bank v. Stateler, 171 U. S. 447, 19 Sup. Ct. 6 (1898).
"i8 Covington v. First Nat. Bank, 185 U. S. 270, 22 Sup. Ct. 645 (1902).
Also a decree confirming the report of commissioners in a partition sale,
ordering a conveyance and sale, with such distribution as might be ordered
when the sale was confirmed. Clark v. Roller, 199 U. S. 541, 26 Sup. Ct.
14 (1905). A decree in admiralty in a proceeding for limitation of liability,
holding that plaintiff is entitled to the limitation as to one class of claims,
and remitting question as to other claims for proof. La Bourgogno, 210
U. S. 95, 28 Sup. Ct. 664 (1908). In a suit to cancel deeds to growing
timber, and to enjoin defendant from cutting the same, a decree adjudging
defendant to have the right of possession, but appointing a master to take
further evidence as to the identity of trees covered by the deeds. Rexford
v. Brunswick Co., 228 U. S. 339, 33 Sup. Ct. 515 (1913).
I have noted only some of the decisions in the United States Supreme
Court in which the McGourkey case has been used as a criterion for deter-
mining a final judgment. It has also been cited in forty some cases in
the federal district and circuit courts, with results which can readily be
imagined.
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method of accomplishing that result. However, it would seem
that restriction, even if it be desirable as an ultimate goal, should
not be exercised blindly. The needs of the appellate court must
be considered, of course, but they are not the only parties inter-
ested in the appeal. Since courts are organized primarily to
serve litigants, their needs cannot be ignored, nor can we put
the trial court entirely out of view. Since the appellate courts
have the last word, however, and since they write the opinions,
we have tended to view the problem mainly from the point of
view of their special difficulty, that is, the danger of excessive
appeals.
Looking at the matter from the standpoint of the trial court,
we see that when an appeal is sought from a given decision, as
for instance, when a demurrer to a complaint has been over-
ruled, or a motion to dismiss denied, there exists what might be
termed a conflict of interest between the trial and appellate
courts. It is to the advantage of the trial court to have the ques-
tion of whether the plaintiff has a cause of action determined at
once by the appellate court, for if he has not, a trial will be un-
necessary. On the other hand, the appellate court will prefer,
especially if its calendar is crowded, not to pass upon the ques-
tion until the trial is had and judgment rendered, thus obviating
the possibility of more than one appeal. Since there are physi-
cal limitations to the amount of work which can be done by
each court, the rules of appeal should be a compromise between
the needs of each. The rule requiring a final judgment before
appeal, however, if rigidly adhered to, relieves only the strain
upon the reviewing court, and the trial court is left to dispose
of its docket as best it can. Perhaps the relief which could be
afforded by a more flexible method of determining when appeals
should be allowed would be small, but there is at least oppor-
tunity for intelligent experimentation. There is no particular
reason why the decisions which may be appealed should be
the same yesterday, today and forever, but rather the courts
might use the process to control to at least a limited extent the
amount of business done by each.
Now as to the litigants, it is rather obvious that to allow or
disallow appeals upon the basis of whether or not the final judg-
ment has been rendered is to ignore wholly the needs created
by the particular situation. If in a partition suit there is a decree
for the sale of property of which defendant claims to be the sole
owner, he will not look kindly upon a decision on appeal which
says that he may not obtain a review of the case until the sale
has been made and the proceeds distributed229 Again, when
-9 Forgay v. Conrad, supra, note 65, illustrates this point very well. But
of course its operation is no worse than that of many other rules of thumb.
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alimony pendente lite has been granted in a divorce suit, are
we to determine whether an appeal shall be allowed upon the
arbitrary basis of whether or not it is a final judgment,", or
shall we take into consideration the fact that to refuse an appeal
will deprive the husband of any review at all, since an appeal
from the final decree is likely to be worthless so far as the
money already paid out is concerned. 21
In other words, it should be recognized that all cases are not
alike; that the need for an appeal may not arise at the same
stage in a partition case or a divorce suit that it does in re-
plevin or in an action on a promissory note.
Aside from these considerations, moreover, there is a further
danger involved. Statutes generally provide a set time within
which the appeal may be taken, and if it is not brought within
that time the right to a review is lost. Now where there is some
doubt as to just which decree is the final one, the litigant is
compelled to choose between the horns of a dilemma. If he
appeals from one decree he may be thrown out of court because
it is not final, while if he waits until a subsequent time to appeal
he may be told that the first decree was the final one and thus
he has lost his chance of appeal. Illustrating this was a case
decided in the Supreme Court of Alabama in 1923.122 There
certain equities of the case were decided in favor of the plaintiff,
with reference to a register to state an account. An appeal was
taken from the decree rendered after the accounting, but more
than six months after the first decree. The court held that the
first decree was the final one, and the statutory time having
elapsed, plaintiff had lost his right to appeal.
As a consequence of the foregoing, the final judgment would
seem to be a wholly inadequate criterion to determine whether
an appeal should be allowed from a given decision. Favored by
appellate courts because it seems to restrict appeals, it would
appear upon analysis to cause about as much labor as it saves,
because it requires repeated litigation over the question of what
120 In Earls v. Earls, 26 Kan. 178 (1881) such a decree was hel4 un-
appealable because not a final judgment. The opposite was hold in Sharon
v. Sharon, 67 Cal. 185, 7 Pac. 456, 635, 8 Pac. 709 (1885). Compare Call
v. Call, 65 Me. 407 (1876), and McKennon v. McKennon, 10 0kla, 400,
63 Pac. 704 (1900), where a more realistic treatment was adopted.
121 It may be worth while here to quote the words of a Connecticut judge,
who uttered them over a century ago:
"If the error is reviewed, after the determination of the action at law,
how inequitable and ruinous the delay! Years may elapse before this
event takes place, and in the meantime the action may run the whole
round of litigation until it is exhausted to the dregs, and the party is
deprived of property in this unnecessary conflict much beyond the whole
value of the matter in question." Magill v. Lyman, supra note 63, at 67.
12 Burgin v. Sugg, 210 Ala. 142, 97 So. 216 (1923).
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is or is not a final judgment. Faced with this situation, and
with the fact that it has no relation to the problems of the trial
court nor to the needs of the parties in a particular case, we
should be prepared to examine the possibilities of discarding the
rule as an instrument for controlling appeals, in favor of some
method more elastic and more capable of meeting the difficulties
raised by our modern judicial system.
VI
Since we may expect with assurance that appeals will continue
to be taken in a vast number of cases, some method of sorting
out those which are to be heard must be provided. If we discard
the final judgment rule as a means to this end, what can we offer
to replace it?
One possibility lies in an increase of the statutory exceptions
to the rule. By this method injustice to litigants in certain sped-
fied types of cases may be avoided, although it does not touch
the difficulty in the vast majority of cases left to be governed by
the old rule, where the concept of the final judgment gives no
accurate criterion by which the question of the time for appeal
may be decided.
Again, the use of the extraordinary writs, mandamus, pro-
hibition, certiorari, and habeas corpus, together with the injunc-
tion, might be expected to give relief in certain types of cases
if used more frequently, but the difficulty here is that the greater
use made of them the more uncertain it becomes just what
remedy should be pursued in a given instance. The principle of
'-es ovdjudicata invariably works for confusion where there are
a number of different remedies used to attain practically the
same result, and even now the books are full of cases where it
is said that the wrong method has been used to bring the dispute
before the appellate court.12 3 The litigant is therefore con-
fronted by the question of whether he will try mandamus, or
prohibition, or whether after all the decision may not be a final
one and thus reviewable by writ of error or appeal to the ex-
clusion of the extraordinary remedies.
One ameliorating influence beginning to be felt might be men-
tioned at this time, namely the crystalization of the rules in
certain type situations. That is, after a great many cases have
been decided in a given jurisdiction, the very fact of the exist-
ence of such a mass of authority tends to compel counsel to
exercise some discrimination in their citation of authority, with
the result that the court may come nearer to a consideration of




the appeal on the merits, or in other words, to deciding whether
it is the type of case, which, for various reasons, should be
heard on appeal. In a decision of that type, there will not be
much talk about the final judgment, but only whether this is the
kind of case the court wants to hear on appeal. This tendency
is illustrated in a recent opinion in the United States Supreme
Court by Mr. Justice Brandeis, 124 in which he held that an order
of the district court denying an application of a defendant under
the National Prohibition Act for a return of papers taken from
him without warrant, and for the suppression of evidence ob-
tained therefrom, was not appealable. There is little or no talk
in the opinion about what is or is not a final judgment, but it is
merely said that in cases of this type appeal will not be allowed.
In view of the disinclination of courts to adopt radical changes
it is probable that any improvement in conditions in the near
future will be brought about by the method just described.
Nevertheless, it seems to the writer that the basic difficulty in the
whole matter will not be solved until the appellate court is given
a complete discretionary power as to the cases which it will
review. The statute providing for appeals could be patterned
after the English system, with appeals only by leave either of
the trial or of the appellate court.122 If thought desirable appeals
could be allowed as of right from certain specified decisions in
particular cases, such as those in the criminal field.
Counsel seeking an appeal would present a simple petition or
application for review, setting out the reasons why this par-
ticular case should be heard. If the situation has been analyzed
correctly in the foregoing discussion, the problem of whether
the application should be granted involves a number of consid-
erations. There are physical limitations to the amount of work
which a trial or appellate court can do, and a balancing of con-
veniences between them must be the primary factor in deciding
whether to review the case. Second, the court will want to con-
sider the effect upon the litigant if the appeal is to be denied.
The question is, will a denial of review work substantial in-
justice.? 6 If so, then the court will want to hear it if at all
possible in view of the amount of work before the court.
Probably the greatest objection which will be urged against
a discretionary appeal is the claim that the court would be
224 Cogen v. U. S. 278 U. S. 221, 48 Sup. Ct. 436 (1929).
125 Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1925, 15 & 16 GEo. V, c. 49, §
27031; 4 HALS. STAT. 159-161. And see Ruf. & Co., Ltd. v. Pauwels, L. R.
t1919] 1 K. B. 660.
126 If it be objected that the words, "substantial injustice," are vague, the
answer is that it is to be hoped they will be so vague that no court will
try to define them in the abstract. The phrase, "final judgment," glveg a
misleading sense of concreteness, with the consequence that frequent
attempts to define it give rise to all the trouble related in part V of the text.
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swamped with petitions for review.' It seems likely to the
writer that the restrictive influence of the final judgment rule
has been overestimated, but in any case the matter can be settled
only by experiment. Certainly a hardboiled appellate court could
go a good way toward handling a large number of petitions. Each
justice could be assigned a certain number for his attention,
and he could weed out those brought on frivolous points, or upon
a type of decision which the court had previously agreed not to
review. Doubtful cases could then be considered by the whole
court if thought necessary. Long petitions would be taboo be-
cause no one would read them, and the attorney who put his
case in a concise manner would be the one to get a hearing.
Under such a system, a drastic curtailment of the types of cases
in which appeals would be allowed might help to educate the
bar to the point where they would cease to attempt to appeal
every case, which after all, is the greatest difficulty involved.
12 7 The result of establishing a discretionary appeal by certiorari in the
United States Supreme Court has given some credence to this view. Peti-
tions for certiorari have increased steadily since enactment of the statute,
and in the October Term, 1929, there -were 692 applications for certiorarL
See Frankfurter and Landis, The Bsiwness of The Supreme Court at
October Term, 1929 (1930) 44 HARV. L. REV. 1. But it should alo be
noted that the Supreme Court has recently shown itself well able to keep
abreast of its work. See Frankfurter and Landis, The Bu sness of the
Supreme Court at October Term, 1930 (1931) 45 11ARV. L. REv. 271.
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